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ABSTRACT 
 
Increasingly, celebrities engage in business not just as endorsers but also with a financial stake and 
decision-making role in the business. Whether initiated by the celebrity or by other founders, we 
refer to such instances of new ventures entering the market with a celebrity engaged in such ways 
as “celebrity entrepreneurship”. Partnering with a celebrity rather than contracting them as a 
celebrity endorser is not without its risks. Even the most mundane information concerning the 
lives of celebrities is newsworthy so when negative information concerning a celebrity surfaces, it 
spreads fast. When celebrities are involved with starting or owning a company, they carry their 
name with them. Under such circumstances, negative information about the celebrity might reflect 
negatively on the company as well. Our findings suggest that negative information a) leads to 
negative attitudes towards the new venture and promotion, b) which is comparable worse for 
celebrity entrepreneur led new ventures; c) new ventures can potentially reduce damage to their 
brand by distancing themselves from the celebrity, d) however, such a maneuver may not be as 
effective when the new venture is run by a celebrity entrepreneur.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Under normal conditions, it appears as though a celebrity becomes a more effective 
communicator when consumers believe they are the entrepreneur behind a new venture rather than 
just an endorser. This is apparently due to an increase in their perceived involvement with the 
companies they endorse. As levels of a celebrity’s perceived involvement increase, attitudes 
towards the new venture and promotions become more positive. (Hunter & Davidsson, 2007; 
Hunter, Davidsson, & Anderson, 2007)  
 
The media narrative surrounding a “celebrity turned entrepreneur” helps to shape perceived 
involvement. Increasingly, celebrities are portrayed as engaged in business not just as endorsers 
but also with a financial stake and decision-making role in the business (Dow, 2005; Miller, 2004; 
Stanley, 2004).  Whether initiated by the celebrity or by other founders, we refer to such instances 
of new ventures entering the market with a celebrity engaged in such ways as “celebrity 
entrepreneurship”.   
 
What happens when negative information is revealed to the public about a celebrity? After all, 
a misbehaving celebrity is nothing new, nor is it uncommon. One high profile example concerns 
Michael Vick, the former quarterback of the Atlanta Falcons who is serving a 23 month sentence 
for running a dog fighting ring and lying to federal prosecutors about his role. Not too long ago, 
Vick signed one of the largest guaranteed contracts in NFL history ("Falcons quarterback Michael 
Vick signs richest NFL deal in history," 2005) and was ranked number 33 in the Worldwide 2005 
Forbes Celebrity power rankings. As news of his indiscretions spread, Nike, Coca Cola, 
 Powerade, and Kraft simply refused to renew his endorsement contract or publicly disassociated 
their brand with Vick (Judd, 2007).  
 
There is evidence to suggest companies are shielded from celebrity endorsers who misbehave. 
Although it is likely that their stock price will take a hit after negative information is revealed, 
(Jacobson, Kulik, & Louie, 2001) it is unlikely that attitudes towards their brand will sour. (Till & 
Shimp, 1998) However, because celebrity entrepreneurs are perceived as being more involved 
than celebrity endorsers, distancing the celebrity from the new venture may be problematic. More 
to the point, we believe that the consequence of negative information when revealed about a 
celebrity entrepreneur will be worse, in terms of attitude towards the brand and ad, for the 
company than if it concerned a celebrity endorser. 
 
In this study we aim to demonstrate that a) Negative information about a celebrity will lead to 
negative attitudes towards the new venture and advertisement, b) this effect will be stronger under 
the celebrity entrepreneur than the celebrity endorser condition, c) the affect of negative 
information will be stronger when a company supports the celebrity rather than firing them, d) the 
consequence of supporting a celebrity entrepreneur when negative information is revealed will be 
more extreme than if they had supported a celebrity endorser.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
When it comes to a valuable resource, it is hard to match celebrity capital. Celebrities have 
been known to turn unknown companies into a recognized entity almost overnight (Dickenson, 
1996) . Their star appeal is used to re-brand and re-position products (Jacobson et al., 2001) where 
other alternatives have failed. Celebrities are particularly effective at generating PR for products in 
cluttered markets (Chapman & Leask, 2001; Larkin, 2002; Pringle & Binet, 2005) made ever more 
accessible by the insatiable desire learn more about their private lives (Gamson, 1994; Ponce de 
Leon, 2002). The vehicle most often used to associate celebrities with a chosen product is 
advertising; where celebrities are known to induce more positive feelings toward ads than non-
celebrity endorsers  (Atkin & Block, 1983; Kamins, 1990; O'Mahony & Meenaghan, 1998). This 
in turn may be one explanation for the high recall rates consumers experience when exposed to 
celebrity ads (Kamen, Azhari, & Kragh, 1975; O'Mahony & Meenaghan, 1998) and greater 
reported purchase intentions  (Atkin & Block, 1983; Friedman & Friedman, 1976).  
 
Arguably, celebrity forms the basis for a sustainable competitive advantage as the capital they 
bring to firms is valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and likely impervious to substitution (see e.g., 
Barney, 1991). So when a new venture launch is accompanied by a celebrity endorsement, classic 
dilemmas such as “liability of newness” (Aldrich & Auster, 1986) and a “lack of legitimacy” 
(Delmar & Shane, 2004) are potentially reduced (cf. Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999).   
 
But what happens when negative information about a celebrity is revealed? Even very 
mundane information concerning the lives of celebrities is newsworthy (Andrews & Jackson, 
2001; Boorstin, 1961; Gabler, 2004; Pringle, 2004) and researchers have known for some time that 
negative is more attention grabbing than positive information (Fiske, 1980). The effect negative 
information will have on a company is partly dependent on how personally responsible their 
spokesperson was. Louie, Kulik and Jacobson (2001) found that a firms stock performance is 
influenced differently depending on whether the celebrity is blameworthy or blameless. The more 
culpable a celebrity was the more likely the firm experienced losses in stock market value. 
Indirectly, negative information may affect attitudes towards the brand and advertisement by 
lowering the credibility (i.e., their trustworthiness and likeability) of an endorser (Klebba & 
 Unger, 1982). Till & Shimp (1998) found that negative information resulted in negative attitudes 
toward the brand only in the case where a fictitious celebrity was used to promote a fictitious 
brand. Surprisingly, when they used a real celebrity to promote the fictitious brand and negative 
information was given, there was no significant negative effect to the brand. Their reasoning was 
in line with research on association set sizes, i.e., the amount of associations one has with the 
brand and celebrity. They reasoned that since there are already many associations with the real 
celebrity, there was little effect on the brand. However, with the made up celebrity, there was a 
small association set size (limited to the information given in the experiment) and therefore 
negative information hurt the brand image. In their concluding remarks, they suggest that negative 
information will hurt new brands more than established brands. Finally, when a celebrity 
misbehaves, a company may take measures to limit the impact on their brand. Under conditions of 
blameless action, a company is well served by associating with the endorser, and unsurprisingly, 
disassociate when a celebrity is at fault for a negative event. (Louie & Obermiller, 2002) 
 
Although the literature on negative celebrity information is limited several important insights 
can be drawn. In general, negative information about a celebrity endorser will result in a lower 
stock price in a high blameworthy situation. Stock price notwithstanding, an advisable course of 
action would be to disassociate (fire) the culpable endorser. Negative information can hurt the 
credibility of a celebrity which reduces their ability to communicate with consumers. It is likely 
that new ventures, due to their reliance on the celebrity brand, will suffer from negative 
information more than an established brand.  
 
Adding to this small body of literature, we investigate and compare the effect high 
blameworthy and negative information will have on attitudes towards a new venture that was 
endorsed by either a celebrity entrepreneur and celebrity endorser. Consequently, our first 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: (Strong Blameworthy) Negative information about a celebrity will lead to negative 
attitudes towards the new venture and advertisement 
 
Celebrities engage in a range of paid activities when working with companies and products.  
According to Kamen, Azhari, & Kragh (1975) the way in which celebrities are used can be broken 
down into four categories: Testimonial, endorser, actor, and spokesperson; each category sharing 
the common denominator of celebrity/brand association.  It is any one of or a combination of these 
activities which we refer to more generally as celebrity endorsement.  
 
Media outlets use the “celebrity entrepreneur” label somewhat loosely. At times it refers to 
individuals who have become famous for their entrepreneurial success (e.g., Richard Branson; 
Steve Jobs; Anita Roddick) (Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004), but it can also refer to those 
celebrities such as Oprah, Jennifer Lopez and Paul Newman who used their fame to help launch a 
business (Lee & Turner, 2004). Although we focus on the latter type, we believe the distinction of 
greatest theoretical and practical importance is their perceived level of involvement with the 
venture.  
 
What is perceived involvement? Perceived involvement is a measure that refers to a 
celebrity’s liking, passion, commitment and enthusiasm for a product(Hunter & Davidsson, 2007). 
Researchers have shown one way celebrities can increase their perceived involvement is by 
becoming an entrepreneur (Hunter & Davidsson, 2007; Hunter et al., 2007). Several studies have 
looked specifically at the consequences of consumers inferring that a celebrity liked the products 
they endorsed and found that it led to improved attitudes towards the brand and advertisement 
 (Silvera & Austad, 2004). This occurred even when they knew the celebrity was paid (Cronley, 
Kardes, Goddard, & Houghton, 1999). However, when consumers do not infer the celebrity likes 
the products they endorse and instead attribute motivations for endorsing a product to money, a 
probable outcome is the formation of a negative attitude  (Chapman & Leask, 2001; Cooper, 1984; 
Dickenson, 1996; King, 1989; Silvera & Austad, 2004). This phenomenon is known as the 
Correspondence Bias1 where individuals tend to draw inferences about a persons dispositions 
based on behaviors that can better be explained by the situation in which they occur (Gilbert & 
Malone, 1995).  
 
In the context of a new venture a correspondence bias works as follows: A celebrity endorses 
a product by asking a consumer to make a purchase or saying it is a great product. If the consumer 
believes the celebrity truly likes the product, there is a good chance that they will attribute the plea 
to purchase the product to the celebrity’s own disposition. However if the consumer feels the 
celebrity was not thrilled about, did not really like or use the product, then they may attribute the 
purchase request to an external factor- such as the celebrity was paid to say what they did. In the 
former, attitudes towards the brand and ad should improve, while in the latter, their attitudes will 
improve less or may even decrease. Because the nature of being a celebrity entrepreneur increases 
the celebrity’s perceived involvement (relative to a celebrity endorser), it is more likely that a 
consumer will make a dispositional attribution that favors the celebrity and ultimately benefits the 
company in terms of improved attitudes.   
 
Similarly, we believe that as a celebrity’s perceived Involvement increases, which manipulate 
by portraying the celebrity as an entrepreneur as opposed to a traditional endorser, consumers will 
make a correspondence bias in their favor. This in turn should amount to more positive attitudes 
towards new ventures endorsed by celebrity entrepreneurs than those endorsed by celebrity 
endorsers. However, when negative information is revealed about the celebrity, we expect an 
opposite, negative reaction. The strong perceived involvement between celebrity and company 
will still induce a correspondence bias, only this time it will negatively affect the company. Our 
second hypothesis follows this reasoning:      
 
H2: The effect of negative information on attitudes towards the ad (H2a) and brand (H2b) 
will be more detrimental under the celebrity entrepreneur than the celebrity endorser 
condition 
 
When negative information surfaces, a company may try to distance themselves from the 
celebrity or stand by them. However, we expect the closer perceived involvement a celebrity 
entrepreneur has with the company may make doing so more difficult. While we expect both 
celebrity led and celebrity endorsed companies to suffer more when they support the celebrity 
rather than fire them, the alternative strategy of firing a celebrity entrepreneur will not be as 
effective as firing a celebrity endorser. Our main argument being it is harder to disassociate from a 
celebrity entrepreneur than it is from a celebrity endorser. Thus we submit our final hypotheses:  
 
H3: The effect of negative information on attitudes towards the ad (H3a) and brand (H3b) 
will be stronger (and negative) when a company supports the celebrity rather than fires 
them. 
 
                                                 
1 Correspondence bias has its roots in attribution theory and is one of the many diverse theories 
that constitute the field (Cronley et al., 1999) 
 H4: Firing a celebrity endorser will result in a differential and less negative attitude 
towards the ad (H4a) and brand then when a celebrity entrepreneur is fired.  
 
METHOD 
 
Two separate experiments were conducted using a 3x2 factorial (or six-way factorial) between 
subjects randomized experiment with a pretest-posttest plus control group design. The second 
experiment was a replication of the first and both were conducted on first year Swedish university 
students. In both experiments, a celebrity advertisement of the Big Dogs Gourmet hamburger and hot 
doq eatery was shown. The company was created for these experiments and does not exist although 
the celebrity pictured in the advertisement, Takeru “The Tsunami” Kobayashi who is an 
internationally renowned competitive eater, was real. The experiments took place separated in time by 
one year on second and first year business students. Participation in both experiments was voluntary 
and all but a few were returned completely filled in according to instructions. Participants were given 
the option to leave the questionnaire blank in the event they chose not to participate. Table 1 provides 
a short demographic summary of the participants in experiments one and two. 
 
    - INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE- 
       
Materials and Procedure 
 
The six different experiment packages were randomly assigned to participants. In experiment one 
there were 24 to 26 participants per group and in experiment two there were between 28 and 41. Each 
participant was given a twelve page “experiment package” printed on black and white A4 paper 
written in English. Each package contained: 1) instructions, 2) demographic questions, 3) one of three 
experimental manipulations (including cover story), 4) a celebrity advertisement, 5) a questionnaire, 6) 
cognitive Spacing task and questions, and 7) a second experiment Manipulation and questions.  Each 
experiment package was identical in every way except for the two single paragraph manipulations that 
appeared on page three and page ten of the package. Below, the rational for each section’s occurrence 
in the experiment package is given. 
 
Instructions 
 
Instructions were described verbally and in written format on the cover page participants received. 
Participants were asked to answer all questions in the survey and were provided with one example of a 
question (unrelated to the experiment) and how it could be answered. After each section in the 
experiment, a reminder was given in bold type and 26 point font to see that all questions were 
answered..   
 
Manipulation 
 
The manipulation can be broken down into three parts: 1) between group manipulation of 
celebrity engagement, 3) memory-clearing task, and 3) manipulation of negative information and 
company response.  
 
Between group manipulation of celebrity engagement:  
 
Participants in experiment groups one and two received the following one paragraph between 
group manipulation (the second paragraph was the same for all groups) intended to cast Kobayashi as 
a celebrity entrepreneur: 
 “Big Dogs” is a fast food restaurant serving hamburgers and hot-dogs. Big Dogs was 
started by the six-time consecutive world hot dog eating champion Takeru “The 
Tsunami” Kobayashi of Japan. In addition to appearing in printed ads, tv and radio, 
Kobayashi is the company owner/president and oversees all managerial decisions, 
including company expansion and of course product testing. As the owner in and main 
investor of Big Dogs, Kobayashi is expected to earn $ 1 million annually.  
Experiment groups three and four received the following treatment intended to portray Kobayashi as 
the “typical” celebrity endorser (the second paragraph was the same for all groups): 
“Big Dogs” is a fast food restaurant serving hamburgers and hot-dogs. Big Dogs has 
hired the six-time consecutive world hot dog eating champion Takeru “The Tsunami” 
Kobayashi of Japan to promote the company and their agreement states that Kobayashi 
appear in print, tv and radio ads. In exchange for his endorsement of Big Dogs, 
Kobayashi is expected to earn $ 1 million annually.  
Finally, groups five and six were the control groups. These groups only received the following 
information also given to all groups:   
The advertisement you saw is part of Big Dog’s promotional push before they open four 
locations next year in Sweden (Malmö, Gothenburg, Stockholm, and Uppsala). Appearing in 
the advertisement was Takeru “The Tsunami” Kobayashi. 
 
Memory clearing task: 
 
The introduction and manipulation of Kobayashi’s involvement in Big Dog’s ended the first half 
of the experiment. Before relaying the negative information treatment to participants, a memory 
clearing task was performed to ensure a restructuring of long-term memory (Till & Shimp, 1998). This 
was done by having all participants read a fictitious article, “Taco Bell Says Increased European 
Expansion is Probable”, supposedly written by Chris Sheridan of the Associated Press. Accompanying 
the article, participants were asked to list their favorite fast food restaurants. Besides having a culinary 
theme, the article and questions were unrelated to the experiment.  
 
Manipulation of negative information and company response: 
 
All participants received a phony article titled “Hot Dog Champion Finds Himself in Legal 
and Financial Limbo” supposedly written by Erin Clarkson which purportedly came from Forbes 
Online.  
The 6 time defending world champion hot dog eater Takeru “The Tsunami” Kobayashi 
finds himself in legal and financial trouble. In January, police arrested Kobayashi after 
causing a near fatal car accident. Kobayashi failed to stop his Toyota Supra from hitting 
the car in front of him when traffic suddenly slowed. The driver in front of him, Kelly 
Martin 46, was rushed to Memorial County Hospital. She is in serious, but stable 
condition. According to police records, Kobayashi’s blood alcohol level was 0.19 
percent, which is more than twice the legal limit in New York of .08.  Kobayashi’s 
attorney agreed to a temporary trial date of March 23 and argued that blood samples 
obtained on the night Kobayashi was arrested were not legal and should be thrown out of 
court. 
 
Between group manipulation of the new ventures response: 
 
Directly following the first paragraph participant groups either received information that the 
company was supporting Kobayashi or that they decided to fire him. The difference between the two 
pieces of information and the actual treatment is in bold type: 
 Fire: Kobayashi has appeared in numerous print and TV advertisements for the Big Dogs 
Corp., a newly founded fast food outlet offering gourmet hamburgers and hot dogs.  
Kobayashi’s legal problems have forced Big Dogs to take action. Last week Big Dogs 
released this statement to the Associated Press: “Big Dogs takes public safety and social 
responsibility very seriously. Mr. Kobayashi is truly sorry for any suffering he has 
caused, however we have decided that it is best for him to step down from his position as 
company endorser.” Before the announcement was made to fire Kobayashi shares of Big 
Dogs (nyse: BIGDG) were up $0.22 to $12.80 by the close of trading. 
Support: …He has assured us that this type of behavior will not happen again and we 
support his decision to remain as the company endorser.” … support… 
 
Celebrity Advertisement 
  
Both rich multimedia (television commercial) and print advertisements were used. The 26 second 
commercial was created by a local advertising agency. The commercial began with classical music 
playing in the background. The music gave off a pretentious vibe that lasted until the actual product 
was revealed. The camera zoomed in on a white plate as condiments, a bun with sausage, then 
ketchup, relish and mustard magically appeared. Once the camera was fully zoomed in on the fancy 
dinner a message faded in over the plate and after a split second replaced the image of the plate. In the 
message “BIG DOGS QUALITY FIRST” was written in all caps and bold face. Underneath there was 
a quotation “Why settle for a hot dog when you can have a BIG DOG?”. Directly below the name 
Takeru Kobayashi appeared followed by a caption: Six Time Defending World Champion Hot Dog 
Eater. After this message is displayed the commercial ends.   
 
After the commercial participants were shown six variations of the ad copy (two of which were 
again shown in the experiment package) that were considered for the campaign. This was done before 
the experiment package was opened and for the same reason the commercial was shown- to build an 
association between celebrity and brand and to establish Big Dogs as a legitimate company. These 
adverts were shown on a large projector screen in full color. The two black and white advertisements 
included in the experiment package included a small picture of Takeru Kobayashi, his name with the 
text underneath “Six Time Defending World Champion Hot Dog Eater” and a picture of the hot-dog 
on a plate. Each advertisement contained one quote from Kobayashi. Either “Treat yourself to a Big 
Dog. The quality and taste of a Big Dog is second to none” or “Why settle for a hot dog when you can 
have a Big Dog? Big Dogs only uses the highest quality beef and never any fillers or preservatives.” 
The advertisements included in the experiment package can be found directly below in figure 1.   
 
-INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE- 
       
Measures 
 
Each experiment package contained three sections. The first section contained demographic and 
control questions before the advertisements were shown in the experiment package (but after they 
were shown on the projector) followed by the main questionnaire. In the second section a memory 
clearing task was conducted and questions unrelated to the experiment were asked. Finally, in the third 
section, several of the main independent and dependent variable questions were repeated.  
 
Independent Variables generated by group stimuli 
 
 Our independents were generated by the experimental treatment. In total there were six participant 
groups. From these six groups a total of five independent variables were derived plus interactions; 
three from the first half of the experiment and two from the second half. They are broken down below: 
 
 Part 1: Manipulation of Celebrity Engagement- 
 Group 1 and 2: Celebrity Entrepreneurship 
 Group 3 and 4: Celebrity Endorser 
 Group 5 and 6: Control 
 
 Part 2: Manipulation of Company Response to Negative Information- 
 Group 1, 3, 5: Fire  
 Group 2, 4, 6: Support  
  
Dependent Variables   
 
Attitude towards the ad (AAD)- was operationalized using MacKenzie, Lutz, and Belch’s (1986) 
scale by asking participants “what is your overall reaction to the advertisement for Big Dogs?”, 
followed by 3 measurements on a 7 point semantic differential scale (unfavorable-favorable; bored-
interested; bad-good). In addition to this, one further question was posed to measure Aad: “Overall, 
how effective are the ads for Big Dogs?” with one measure on a 7 point semantic differential scale 
(extremely ineffective- extremely effective). Internal reliability (α=0.93 and α=0.88).  
 
Attitude towards the brand (ABR)- was operationalized using the MacKenzie et al. (1986) scale by 
asking participants “My overall feeling towards the company “Big Dogs” is:”, followed by 3 
measurements on a 7 point semantic differential scale (unfavorable-favorable; negative-positive; 
strongly dislike-strongly like). In addition to this, one further question was posed to measure Abr: 
“Overall how appealing to you is the Big Dogs Company” followed with one measure on a 7 point 
semantic differential scale (extremely low appeal- extremely high appeal). Internal reliability (α=0.92 
and α=0.93). 
 
Measures taken in the second half of the experiment—Once the negative information and 
company response was given, repeat measures were taken. Attitude towards the advertisement and 
attitude towards the brand were measured using the same questions as before.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Our first hypothesis states that (strong blameworthy) negative information about a celebrity 
will lead to negative attitudes towards the new venture (brand) and advertisement. This hypothesis 
tests the assumption that regardless of company response to negative information about a celebrity 
(i.e., fire or support), attitudes towards the AD and Brand will suffer after participants receive this 
new information. To test this theory we conducted a paired samples T test using our summated 
scales for attitude towards the Ad and Brand before negative information was given and 
afterwards. Our paired samples statistics table reveals (see table 2) that our means do in fact 
decrease as expected in both experiment 1 and 2.  
 
     -INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE- 
            
Based on our paired samples t Test (see table 3) we find that in both experiments, ABR 
decreases at acceptable significance levels (p<.05) when negative information is revealed about 
the celebrity. With regards to AAD there is also a notable decrease that comes very close to 
 acceptable levels of significance (p=.09 and .07). We consider the significant decreases in ABR 
and nearly significant decrease in AAD as support for our first hypothesis. That is, attitudes 
towards a new venture and its advertisements tend to worsen when negative information is 
revealed about the celebrity. Hypothesis 1 supported.  
 
    - INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE- 
        
Although our first hypothesis adds to the small body of literature concerning the 
consequences of negative celebrity information on a new venture, we are more interested in the 
differences between new ventures led by celebrity entrepreneurs compared with those that are only 
endorsed by a celebrity. Our next hypothesis (H2) addresses this issue—specifically we suggest 
that the effect of negative information on attitudes towards the ad (H2a) and brand (H2b) will be 
more detrimental under the celebrity entrepreneur than the celebrity endorser condition 
 
We test this hypothesis using univariate analysis of variance. Before getting started, we 
computed a new dependent variable for AAD and ABR by subtracting the attitude scores before 
negative information was introduced from after. In effect, we create a variable that captures the 
difference of attitudes before and after negative information. With this computed dependent 
variable, we can determine whether or not being an entrepreneur has a more deleterious effect on 
attitudes than being an endorser. Our independent variable for this test, celebrity engagement, was 
entered into the equation as a fixed effect. We then included our computed variable, difference in 
attitude towards brand (ad), as our DV. 
 
In table 4 below is a table summary of the results. Our univariate test along with the pairwise 
comparisons for entrepreneur versus endorser provides some support for our hypothesis. In both 
experiments, the mean change in attitude toward the ad is consistent with the direction we 
hypothesize although not significantly [F(2,143)=.26, p=.39; F(2,198)=.85, p=.20]. There is 
simply not enough evidence to support our hypothesis that AAD will be more affected by negative 
information in the celebrity entrepreneur condition than it is in the celebrity endorser condition. 
We therefore reject H2a based on a lack of empirical evidence.  
 
    - INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE- 
 
We find more supportive results for change in attitude towards the brand however. In our first 
experiment there is a significant mean difference F(2,143)=2.38, p=.05 between the change in 
attitudes towards the brand once negative information is introduced. In this first experiment it 
certainly appears as if the change in attitudes towards the brand is more severe (and negative) 
when the celebrity is portrayed as an entrepreneur. In our second experiment we again find that the 
mean change is in the expected direction however this time our result is not significant 
F(2,198)=.37, p=.35. We regard the significant finding in the first experiment and non-significant 
albeit directional finding in our second as support for H2b. Thus, H2b is supported   
 
We now turn to our third hypothesis— the effect of negative information on attitudes towards 
the ad (H3a) and brand (H3b) will be stronger (and negative) when a company supports the 
celebrity rather than fires them. We follow the same procedure to test this hypothesis as we did in 
hypothesis two; only this time we use company response as our independent variable and we are 
mainly interested in the pairwise comparison between supporting the celebrity versus firing them.  
  
Our results in table 5 clearly show there is a lack of evidence to support H3a. The 
insignificant F ratio is only .74 and .96 in experiments 1 and 2 respectively. We therefore find 
 little cause to claim that the decision to support a misbehaving celebrity will have more severe 
consequences on attitude towards the ad then if the company had fired the celebrity. Thus, we can 
confidently reject hypothesis 3a.  
 
     -INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE- 
            
Once again, our hypothesis directed towards the change in ABR is a mixed bag. In our first 
experiment we find clear evidence in support of H3b. It appears as though supporting a celebrity 
when negative information is revealed leads to a greater (and negative) change in attitude towards 
the brand than if the company chose to terminate the celebrity F(1,143)=3.09, p=.04. In other 
words, firing the celebrity (instead of supporting them) would have reduced the negative change in 
ABR.  In the second experiment, our hypothesis is not supported. We do find a significant change 
occurring however it is not in the hypothesized direction F(1,198)=4.2, p=.02. We therefore 
conclude that Hypothesis 3b is tentatively supported.  
 
In our final hypothesis we suggest that firing a celebrity endorser will result in a differential 
and less negative attitude towards the ad (H4a) and brand then when a celebrity entrepreneur is 
fired. This hypothesis suggests there will be an interaction effect between our independent variable 
celebrity engagement and company response. For our hypothesis to be supported, we would 
expect to find that negative information negatively affects change in AAB (AD) and in addition, 
when company response is included this change should be differentially larger (and more 
negative) for the entrepreneur condition. We have already covered the main effects in our previous 
hypotheses so we will not repeat them here.  
 
We test this relationship with a two-way, between-groups analysis of variance by ordering the 
univariate routine in SPSS. Our fixed factors are our IVs celebrity engagement (entrepreneur, 
endorser) and company response (fire, support). We remove the control group for the purpose of 
this test as our hypothesis makes no prediction in this regard. Next our dependent variables AAD 
or ABR are added.  using each of the six groups individually as our IV and the change in 
AAD(ABR) as our DV. 
 
Our interaction effects for ABR did not reach statistical significance in either experiment 1 or 
experiment 2: [F(1,95)=0.00, p=.50]; [F(1,132)=,031, p=.43]. The low F values and poor 
significance levels provide virtually no support for our hypothesis H4b. We therefore reject H4b, 
that is, we could find no evidence to suggest a company that fires a celebrity endorser will fare 
better than a company that fires a celebrity entrepreneur- it appears as though brands in both 
scenarios suffer equally. 
 
Interaction effect results on H4a were more promising even though our tests failed to show 
significance [F(1,95)=1.22, p=.37]; [F(1,132)=2.257, p=.07]. It is perhaps worth emphasizing that 
in our second experiment, we approach statistical significance with an F value of 2.26 and p=.07, 
although our effect size of .02 is small (Cohen, 1988). Looking at our interaction effect plot (see 
figure 2 below), we see that supporting a celebrity entrepreneur and a celebrity endorser has 
virtually the same negative effect on AAD. However, when a celebrity endorser is fired, the 
negative effect on AAD is not as extreme as it is when a celebrity entrepreneur is fired. We 
interpret our finding from experiment two with cautious optimism, however in light of our non-
result in experiment one we feel compelled to reject hypothesis H4a.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The results from these experiments suggest that (blameworthy) negative information about a 
misbehaving celebrity will reflect negatively on consumers’ attitudes towards the new venture and 
promotion. However, when consumers believe that the culpable celebrity is an entrepreneur their 
attitudes towards the new venture become even more sour than if they believed the celebrity was 
only engaged in the new venture as an endorser. We have also tested how a new venture’s 
response to negative information affects consumers’ attitude towards the venture and promotion. 
We were surprised to find attitudes towards the advertisement remained similar regardless of 
whether the company chose to support or fire the celebrity. That being said, we did find tentative 
support that firing a celebrity after negative information surfaced resulted in less negative attitudes 
towards the new venture. Finally, we hypothesized that firing a celebrity endorser would result in 
a differential and less negative attitude towards the ad and brand then when a celebrity 
entrepreneur is fired. Although we rejected this hypothesis, there appeared to be some support for 
the notion that attitudes towards the ad will be less affected when a celebrity endorser is fired than 
when a celebrity entrepreneur is fired.  
 
There are several important limitations that we would like to point out. Due to our lengthy 
experimental design, participants were required to read and complete a 12 page experimental 
package. The length of this experimental package concerned us. To reduce the overall task we 
removed several important questions related to our manipulation checks. As a result we have no 
direct way of knowing how successfully our manipulations were internalized. Indirectly, we have 
had to rely on previous, but similar, experiments to assess the effectiveness. Our past experimental 
manipulations revealed that on the whole our experiments were successful, however as many as 
10% of respondents missed key pieces of information. If anything, we believe this has led us to an 
under-represent our results. Furthermore, our sample consisted of first and second year Swedish 
university student- therefore the results of this study should be seen as a basis for further 
replication and further generalizations should be made carefully.  
 
Celebrity capital represents a valuable resource (Wernerfelt, 1984) that firms can use as a 
catalyst for establishing legitimacy. Legitimacy is an important intangible for firms as it affords 
them more opportunities to secure much needed financing (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). 
Consumers benefit from incremental experiential brand experiences (Srivastave, Fahey, & 
Christensen, 2001), while the company can expect higher product cash flows (Agrawal & 
Kamakura, 1995; Simon & Sullivan, 1993) as well as improved sales and margins (Riezebos, 
2003).  
 
The decision of whether to partner with or hire a celebrity is therefore an important one for 
new ventures. The limited research available on this phenomenon suggests it is a more effective 
use of celebrity capital to start a company with a celebrity entrepreneur than it is to hire a celebrity 
endorser (Hunter & Davidsson, 2007; Hunter et al., 2007); in part due to an increase in perceived 
celebrity involvement which translates into more effective communication. However, if we 
consider the implications to the new venture of a celebrity misbehaving the decision becomes 
more difficult. Our findings suggest when negative information about a celebrity surfaces, it is 
better to have hired a celebrity endorser than to have partnered with a celebrity entrepreneur—but 
only just.  
 
We feel this study makes two important contributions. First, we add to a very limited body of 
scholarly knowledge on the effects negative information about a celebrity has on a new venture. 
Second, we highlight and substantiate important empirical differences between celebrity capital 
when coupled with celebrity endorsement and celebrity entrepreneurship.  
 CONTACT: Erik Hunter, erik.hunter@ihh.hj.se; +46 (0)36 101841; (F) +46 (0)36 161069; 
Box 1026, SE-551 11 Jönköping. 
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 Table 1. Demographic Summary for Experiments 1-2 
 
Table 2. Paired Sample Statistics- Hypothesis 1 
Paired Samples 
Statistics Mean(1) (2) N(1) (2) 
Std. 
D.(1) (2) 
AAD Before 3.67 3.51 149 204 1.36 1.17 
AAD After 3.55 3.42 149 204 1.30 1.10 
ABR Before 4.07 3.63 149 204 1.20 1.19 
ABR After 3.87 3.49 149 204 1.33 1.15 
(1)=experiment 1, 
(2)=experiment 2  
 
Table 3. Paired Samples T test on Hypothesis 1 
Paired Samples Test 
  
Paired 
Differences   T Df Sig.* 
 Mean 
Std. 
D.    
Experiment (1)      
AAD before/after 0.12 1.05 1.39 148 0.09 
ABR before/after 0.20 1.17 2.10 148 0.02 
Experiment (2)      
AAD before/after 0.09 0.84 1.52 203 0.07 
ABR before/after 0.14 0.67 3.10 203 0.00 
*Reported Sig. 1-
tailed           
 
Table 4. Summary Statistics including pairwise comparisons for H2. 
Univariate Tests-Celebrity 
Engagement        
Exp.  
Dependent 
Variable 
(main effects) 
Mean 
Comparison 
Mean 
Difference 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F ratio 
Partial Eta 
squared 
1 Change AAD Ent. Vs. End. -0.08 0.59 2(143) 0.29 0.26 0.004 
2 Change AAD Ent. Vs. End. -0.19 1.21 2(198) 0.61 0.85 0.009 
1 Change ABR Ent. Vs. End. -0.50 6.41 2(143) 3.2 2.38* 0.032 
2 Change ABR Ent. Vs. End. -0.03 0.33 2(198) 0.17 0.37 0.004 
P<0.05*; p<0.01**; p<0.001***; Univariate Tests           
 
Experiment Course # of Participants Average age Gender Split
1 Marketing 149 21.2 76m; 73f
2 Entrepreneurship 206 20.8 119m; 86f*
Totals 355 21 195m; 159f
*Includes one missing variable for gender
  Table 5. Summary Statistics including Pairwise Comparisons for H3. 
 
Figure 1. Advertisement used in experiment package 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Profile Plot for AAD in Experiment 2; H4a 
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Univariate Tests- Company Response       
Exp.  
Dependent 
Variable (main 
effects) 
Mean 
Comparison 
Mean 
Difference 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F ratio 
Partial Eta 
squared 
1 Difference AAD Support Vs. Fire .149 0.83 1(143) 0.83 0.74 0.005 
2 Difference AAD Support Vs. Fire -.006 0.002 1(198) 0.002 0.96 0.000 
1 Difference ABR Support Vs. Fire -.335 4.17 1(143) 4.17 3.09* 0.021 
2 Difference ABR Support Vs. Fire .192 1.86 1(198) 1.86 4.20* 0.021 
P<0.05*; p<0.01**; p<0.001***; Univariate Tests           
